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ABSTRACT
Despite the wide use of machine learning in adversarial settings
including computer security, recent studies have demonstrated
vulnerabilities to evasion attacks—carefully crafted adversarial sam-
ples that closely resemble legitimate instances, but cause misclas-
sification. In this paper, we examine the adequacy of the leading
approach to generating adversarial samples—the gradient descent
approach. In particular (1) we perform extensive experiments on
three datasets, MNIST, USPS and Spambase, in order to analyse the
effectiveness of the gradient-descent method against non-linear
support vector machines, and conclude that carefully reduced ker-
nel smoothness can significantly increase robustness to the attack;
(2) we demonstrate that separated inter-class support vectors lead to
more secure models, and propose a quantity similar to margin that
can efficiently predict potential susceptibility to gradient-descent
attacks, before the attack is launched; and (3) we design a new
adversarial sample construction algorithm based on optimising the
multiplicative ratio of class decision functions.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed several demonstrations of machine
learning vulnerabilities in adversarial settings [1, 3, 7, 8, 13, 14, 21,
23, 34]. For example, it has been shown that a wide rage of machine
learning models—including deep neural networks (DNNs), support
vector machines (SVMs), logistic regression, decision trees and k-
nearest neighbours (kNNs)—can be easily fooled by evasion attacks
via adversarial samples [5, 14, 26, 29, 30, 32].
We refer to the carefully crafted inputs that resemble legitimate
instances but cause misclassification, as adversarial samples, and
the malicious behaviours that generate them as evasion attacks [35].
Figure 1 illustrates the attack’s effect in the previously-explored
vision domain [14, 32, 38]: Figures 1a and 1b present original images
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(a) Adam (b) Lucas (c) Adam or Lucas?
Figure 1: An example evasion attack against a learning
model: Image (c) is misclassified as Lucas.
from [36] for “Adam” and “Lucas”, who are correctly identified by an
SVM face recogniser. However, after human-indiscernible changes
are applied to Figure 1a the model mistakenly identifies Figure 1c
as “Lucas”.
Thanks to its approximation of best-response and simplicity,
gradient descent has emerged as the leading approach for creating
adversarial samples [5]. While plentiful in the literature, analyses of
evasion attacks tend to present only a handful of adversarial samples
like Figure 1, or attack success rates for limited hyperparameters
settings. Such results are useful proofs of concept, but fail to provide
a systematic analysis of the competence of the gradient descent
method and best response more generally. Does the method have
any structural limitations? Can gradient descent based evasion
attacks be reliably thwarted, without cost to learner accuracy?
Are there effective attack alternatives? This paper addresses these
questions, with a case study on the support vector machine with
radial basis function kernel.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first rigorous evaluation
of the gradient descent method in classifier evasion settings. Not
only do we demonstrate that appropriate choice of smoothness
(RBF SVM kernel width) can significantly degrade attack success,
but that we can even predict when attacks will be successful with-
out ever launching them.
Main contributions: Specifically, our contributions include:
• An analysis of the kernel precision parameter’s impact on
the success rate of evasion attacks, illustrating the existence
of a phase transition, and concluding that carefully reduced
kernel smoothness achieves robustness to gradient-descent
attacks without sacrificing SVM accuracy;
• Anovel geometric parameter related tomargin, that strongly
correlates with model vulnerability, providing a new av-
enue to predict (unseen) attack vulnerability; and
• A new approach for generating adversarial samples in
multiclass scenarios, with results demonstrating higher
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effectiveness for evasion attacks than the gradient descent
method.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2
overviews previous work on evasion attacks; Section 3 presents our
research problem; we present a detailed example of how gradient-
descent can fail in Section 4; Section 5 presents the gradient-quotient
approach for constructing adversarial samples; experimental results
are presented in Sections 6 and 7; and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 RELATEDWORK
Barreno et al. [3] categorise how an adversary can tamper with
a classifier based on whether they have (partial) control over the
training data: in causative attacks, the adversary can modify the
training data to manipulate the learned model; in exploratory at-
tacks, the attacker does not poison training, but carefully alters
target test instances to flip classifications. See also [2, 16]. This pa-
per focuses on the targeted exploratory case, also known as evasion
attacks [5].
Generalising results on efficient evasion of linear classifiers via
reverse engineering [23], Nelson et al. [28] consider families of
convex-inducing classifiers, and propose query algorithms that
require polynomially-many queries and achieve near-optimal mod-
ification cost. The generation of adversarial samples in their setting
leverages membership queries only: the target classifier responds
to probes with signed classifications only. Formulating evasion as
optimisation of the target classifier’s continuous scores, Biggio et al.
[5, 6] first used gradient descent to produce adversarial samples.
Szegedy et al. [38] demonstrate changes imperceptible to humans
that cause deep neural networks (DNNs) to misclassify images. Ad-
ditionally, they offer a linear explanation of adversarial samples
and design a “fast gradient sign method” for generating such sam-
ples [14]. In a similar vein, Nguyen et al. [29] propose an approach
for producing DNN-adversarial samples unrecognisable as such to
humans.
Papernot et al. published a series of further works in this area:
(1) introducing an algorithm that searches for minimal regions of
inputs to perturb [32]; (2) demonstrating effectiveness of attacking
target models via surrogates—with over 80% of adversarial samples
launched fooling the victim in one instance [31]; (3) improved
approaches for fitting surrogates, with further investigation of
intra- and cross-technique transferability between DNNs, logistic
regression, SVMs, decision trees and k-nearest neighbours [30].
Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [27] propose algorithm DeepFool for
generating adversarial samples against DNNs, which leads samples
along trajectories orthogonal to the decision boundary. A similar
approach against linear SVM is proposed in [30]. Based on Deep-
Fool, Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [26] design a method for computing
“universal perturbations” that fool multiple DNNs.
In terms of defending against evasion attacks, Goodfellow et al.
[14], Szegedy et al. [38] propose injecting adversarial examples
into training, in order to improve the generalization capabilities
of DNNs. This approach resembles active learning. Papernot et al.
[33] demonstrate using distillation strategy against saliency map
attack. But it has been proven to be ineffective by [9]. Carlini and
Wagner [10], Gu and Rigazio [15], Huang et al. [17], Luo et al.
[24], Miyato et al. [25], Shaham et al. [37], Zhao and Griffin [41],
Zheng et al. [42] have designed various structural modifications
for neural networks. In addition, Bhagoji et al. [4], Zhang et al.
[40] propose defense methods based on dimensionality reduction
via principal component analysis (PCA), and reduced feature sets,
respectively. However, they contradict with [20] which suggests
that more features should be used when facing adversarial evasion.
Most relevant to this paper is the work by Russu et al. [35],
which analyses the robustness of SVMs against evasion attacks,
including the selection of the regularisation term, kernel function,
classification costs and kernel parameters. Our work delivers a
much more detailed analysis of exactly how the kernel parameters
impact vulnerability of RBF SVM, and explanations of why.
3 PRELIMINARIES & PROBLEM STATEMENT
This section recalls evasion attacks, the gradient-descent method,
the RBF SVM, and summarises the research problem addressed by
this paper.
Evasion Attacks. For target classifier f : Rd → {−1, 1}, the
purpose of an evasion attack is to apply minimum change δ to a
target input x , so that the perturbed point is misclassified, i.e.,
sgn(f (x)) , sgn(f (x + δ)). The magnitude of adversarial per-
turbation δ is commonly quantified in terms of L1 distance, i.e.,
∥δ ∥1 =
∑d
i=1 |δi |. Formally, evasion attacks are framed as optimi-
sation:
arg min
δ ∈Rd
∥δ ∥1 (1)
s.t. sgn(f (x)) , sgn(f (x + δ)) .
Note that we permit attackers that can modify all features of
the input, arbitrarily, but that aim to minimise the magnitude of
changes. Both binary and multiclass scenarios fall into the eva-
sion problem as described; we consider both learning tasks in this
paper. In multiclass settings, attacks intending to cause specific
misclassification of the test sample are known as mimicry attacks.
Gradient-Descent Method. The gradient descent method1 has
been widely used for generating adversarial samples for evasion at-
tacks [5, 14, 27, 32], when f outputs confidence scores in R and clas-
sifications are obtained by thresholding at τ = 0. The approach ap-
plies gradient descent to f directly, initialised at the target instance.
Formally given target instance x0 ∈ Rd evaluating f (x0) > τ ,
xt+1 = xt − εt · ∇x f (xt ) ,
where εt follows an appropriately-selected step size schedule, and
the iteration is terminated when f (xt ) < τ .
The Support Vector Machine. Recall the dual program of the
soft-margin SVM classifier learner, with hinge-loss
arg max
α ∈Rn
1′α − 12α
′Gα (2)
s.t. α ′y = 0, 0 ⪯ α ⪯ C1
where {(x i ,yi ), i = 1, . . . ,n} is the training data with x i ∈ Rn
and yi ∈ {−1, 1}n , α are Lagrange multipliers, 0, 1 the all zeros,
ones vectors, C > 0 the regularisation penalty parameter on mis-
classified samples, and G the n × n Gram matrix with entriesGi j =
1Not to be confused with gradient descent for local optimisation.
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Figure 2: Heatmaps visualising decision boundaries of RBF SVM’s trained on a sample dataset. (a) γ = 102 model: two black
curves display attack paths under gradient descent, of two target points reaching the decision boundary; (b) γ = 104 model:
two magenta curves display attack paths under gradient descent, of the two target points now move away from the boundary
or take significantly more steps.
yiyjk(x i ,x j ). The RBF kernel k(x i ,x j ) = exp(−γ
x i − x j22) has
precision parameter γ > 0 that controls kernel width
√
2/γ . By the
Representer Theorem, the learned classifier
f (x) =
n∑
i=1
αiyik(x i ,x) + b . (3)
Adequacy and Improvements to Gradient-Descent Method.
While the gradient-descent method has been effective against a
number of machine learning models, e.g., DNNs, linear SVMs, logis-
tic regression [5, 14, 27, 29, 31], there is no general guarantee that
gradient descent converges to a global minimum of f (·) or even
converges to local optima quickly—relevant to computational com-
plexity (a measure of hardness) of evasion. Under linear models—a
major focus of past work—gradient descent quickly finds global
optima. While DNNs have been argued to exhibit local linearity, the
existing body of evidence is insufficient to properly assess the ef-
fectiveness of the attack approach. As we argue in the next section,
the approach is in fact unlikely to be successful against certain SVMs
with RBF kernels, when kernel parameter γ is chosen appropriately.
Problem 3.1. What limitations of the gradient-descent method
are to be expected when applied to evasion attacks?
Problem 3.2. Are there simple defences to the gradient-descent
method for popular learners?
Problem 3.3. Are there more effective alternative approaches to
generating adversarial samples?
We address each of these problems in this paper, with special
focus on the RBF SVM as a case study and important example of
where the most popular approach to evasion attack generation can
predictably fail, and be improved upon.
4 GRADIENT-DESCENT METHOD FAILURE
MODES
In this section, we explore how the gradient-descent method can
fail against RBF SVMs with small kernel widths.
Illustrative Example. To demonstrate our key observation, we
trained two RBF SVMs on a toy two-class dataset comprising two
features [11, 12], using two distinct values for γ : 102 and 104. Fig-
ure 2 displays the heatmaps of the two models’ decision functions.
As can be seen, for the larger γ case, additional regions result with
flat, approximately-zero, decision values. Since the gradients in
these regions are vanishingly small, it is significantly more likely
that an iterate in the gradient-descent method’s attack trajectory
will become trapped, or even move towards a direction away from
the decision boundary altogether. Notably, both models achieve test
accuracies of 100%.
In Figure 2(a), the two black curves marked with crosses demon-
strate how two initial target points (−0.55,−0.1) and (−0.75,−0.5),
move towards the decision boundary following the gradient-descent
method. However, the two magenta curves marked with squares
in Figure 2(b) demonstrate how the same two points either move
away from the boundary or take significantly more steps to reach
it, following the same algorithm but under a different model with a
much larger γ .
This example illustrates that although the gradient-descentmethod
makes the test sample less similar to the original class, it does not
necessarily become similar to the other class.
Discussion.We employ Figure 3 to further explain possible failure
modes of the gradient-descent method: points may get stuck or
even move in the wrong direction. In this given 2D case, x1 belongs
to Class 1, and x2 to Class 2. At instance x , the kth component of
the gradient is ∇k f (x) = ∑2i=1 2γαiyi (xki −xk ) ·exp(−γ ∥x − x i ∥22).
Clearly, the sign of ∇k can be flipped by various choices of γ . Sup-
pose x11 , x
1
2 > x
1, then solving for ∇1 = 0, we obtain the point at
which this phase transition occurs as:
γ =
logα1(x11 − x1) − logα2(x12 − x1)
∥x − x1∥22 − ∥x − x2∥22
.
The failure modes hold true in multiclass scenarios. For test
sample x the classifier evaluates an fi (x) per class i and selects the
maximiser (a one-vs-all reduction). Suppose that f1(x) and f2(x)
are the highest class scores. If γ is chosen appropriately as above,
, ,
x1
x2
Class 1 (+)
Class 2 (−)
t
Smaller width Larger gap
+ −
width = (2/γ)½ 
gap
Figure 3: Gradient-descent method failure modes.
then gradient descent reduces both f1(x) and f2(x) without ever
reranking the two classes.
Figure 3 presents a geometric explanation, where distance be-
tween support vectors of opposite classes exceeding kernel width
results in gradient-descent method iterates becoming trapped in
the “gap” between. This section partially addresses Problem 3.1
through the discussed limitations, while setting γ can provide a
level of defence per Problem 3.2.
5 THE GRADIENT-QUOTIENT METHOD
The previous section motivates Problem 3.3’s search for effective
alternatives to decreasing current class i fi (x) while increasing
desired class j fj (x). Rather thanmoving in the direction−∇fi (x) as
the gradient-descent method does (noting this is in the subgradient
for the one-vs-all reduction), we propose following the gradient of
the quotient −fi (x)/fj (x):
xt+1 = xt − εt · ∇(fi (x)/fj (x)) .
Remark 1. Employing fi (x) − fj (x) in place of fi (x)/fj (x) does
not achieve the desired result by the same flaws suffered by the
gradient-descent method: fi (x), fj (x) and fi (x) − fj (x) are decreased
simultaneously, while fi (x) can remain larger than fj (x), with no
misclassification occurring.
Note that while in the above, i is taken as the current (maximis-
ing) class index, taking j as the next highest-scoring class corre-
sponds to evasion attacks while taking j as any fixed target class
corresponds to a mimicry attack. The results of Section 7 establish
that this method can be more effective for manipulating test data in
multiclass settings. However, it is not appropriate to binary-class
cases as −f1(x)/f2(x) = 1.
Step Size. The step size εt is important to select carefully: too small
and convergence slows; too large and the attack incurs excessive
L1 change, potentially exposing the attack.
In our experiments, we limit the largest change made to a single
feature per iteration, and determine the step size accordingly as
described in Algorithm 1. Here η is a domain-specific value corre-
sponding to a unit change in a feature, e.g., for a grayscale image
η = 1 corresponds to a unit change intensity level. The select rule’s
[5η, 10η] is motivated by round-off practicalities in steps: if the
largest gradient component were smaller than 5η, it is likely that
Algorithm 1: Gradient-quotient step size.
Input : Iterate xt ; Current quotient gradient ∇ ∈ Rd ;
Parameter η > 0
Output :Step size εt
1 Select i ∈ argmaxj ∈[d ] |∇j |.
2 Select εt > 0 such that εt · |∇i | ∈
√
t[5η, 10η].
Table 1: Summary of the datasets used in this paper
Name Size Features Domain Range
Training set Test set
MNIST 5 × 104 104 28 × 28 Vision [0, 1]
USPS 7291 2007 16 × 16 Vision [-1, 1]
Spambase 3000 1601 57 Spam [0, 1]
most other components would be 0, making convergence extremely
slow. Since [5η, 10η] is a relatively conservative start, we increase it
gradually; as explained next, the maximum step number in our ex-
periments is 30. This increasing step size corresponds to a variant of
guess-then-double. In addition, another advantage of Algorithm 1 is
that it produces a similar amount of L1 changes to the test samples,
despite different values of γ .
6 EXPERIMENTS: GRADIENT-DESCENT
METHOD
Section 4 demonstrates that RBF SVM is less vulnerable to evasion
attacks when γ is set appropriately. In this section, we present a
more detailed analysis of the impact of γ on the attack’s success
rate, further addressing Problems 3.1 and 3.2.
6.1 Datasets
Three datasets are selected to facilitate the analysis on γ : (1) MNIST
[18, 19] is a dataset of handwritten digits that has been widely
studied. It contains a training set of 6 × 104 samples (only the first
5 × 104 are used in our experiments), and a test set of 104 samples.
Following the approach of [30], we divide the training set into 5
subsets of 104 samples,D1 ∼ D5. Each subset is used to train models
separately. Specifically, in the experiments that study binary-class
settings, only the data in D1 (or the test dataset) that belong to
the two classes are used for training (or testing respectively). (2)
USPS [39] is another dataset of (normalised) handwritten digits
scanned from envelopes by the U.S. Postal Service. There are 7291
training observations and 2007 test observations, each of which
is a 16 × 16 grayscale image. (3) Spambase [22] contains a total
number of 4601 emails, with 1813 (2788) being spam (non-spam).
In our experiments, we randomly select 3000 emails as the training
set, and the remainder as the test set. Table 1 summarises the key
information of these three datasets. Note that MNIST and Spambase
are scaled to [0,1], while USPS is scaled to [-1, 1].
6.2 Impact of γ on Vulnerability (Binary Class)
We begin with the binary scenario and investigate how γ impacts
the success rate of causing SVMs to misclassify (1) three pairs of
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Figure 5: Minimum distance between each support vector of
class “4” and all support vectors of class “3” in the MNIST
dataset.
digits—1 & 2, 3 & 4, 5 & 7 for the MNIST dataset, (2) three pairs
of digits—0 & 1, 2 & 3, 6 & 7 for the USPS dataset, and (3) spam
and non-spam emails for the Spambase dataset. Note that in this
subsection, all models regarding the MNIST dataset are trained on
D1. An attack is considered successful if the perturbed test sample
is misclassified within 30 steps. The reason why we choose 30 is
that although larger values will increase the attack’s success rate,
the changes made to the original samples are so obvious they would
be easily detected by manual audit.
Tables 2a–2c, 3a–3c and 4 illustrate a phase transition in all
cases: a small decrease of γ causes a significant jump in suc-
cess rate. Figure 6 visualises the phase transition. 2
From the attacker’s point of view, in addition to minimising the
overall changes, it is also desirable that no single pixel is modified by
a large amount when perturbing an image, i.e., ∥δ ∥∞ < B∞ ∈ R+
(B∞ can be considered as the attacker’s budget). Therefore, we
modify the original optimisation problem 1 as follows:
arg min
δ ∈Rd
∥δ ∥1 (4)
s.t. sgn(f (x)) , sgn(f (x + δ))
∥δ ∥1 < B1 ∈ R+,
∥δ ∥∞ < B∞ ∈ R+
We apply much stricter stopping criteria, and re-run the exper-
iments on MNIST and USPS. As can be seen from Tables 5 & 6, a
phase transition still exists in each case.
Inter-Class-SV Distance. Since γ controls how quickly the RBF
kernel vanishes, we are motivated to compare minimum (Euclidean)
distance between each support vector of one class (sv1i ) and all
support vectors of the opposite class (sv2j ), i.e., MinDist(sv1i ) =
argminj Distance(sv1i , sv2j ). Our intuition is that a larger γ sug-
gests (1) a quicker drop of values for both the kernel function and
the gradient; (2) a wider gap between the two classes. Both obser-
vations contribute to the lower success rate of the evasion attack.
2Testing for effect ofC revealed much less impact on success rate. Therefore, a smaller
value of C is used in certain cases.
Figures 4 and 5 present the minimum distance between sup-
port vectors of classes “3” and “4” in the MNIST dataset (due to
similarities, we omit the other results). Observe that when γ first
decreases from 0.5, the support vectors of the opposite class move
further away—here the corresponding model is still less vulnerable
to evasion attack. As γ continues to decrease the trend reverses, i.e.,
the support vectors of opposite class move closer to each other. A
smaller γ already means the RBF kernel vanishes more slowly, and
the closer distance between the two classes makes it even easier
for a test sample to cross the decision boundary. Consequently, the
corresponding model becomes much more vulnerable.
This prompts the question: Given a model with aγ , is there a way
to determine whether the model is robust? The results in Tables 2a–
2c, 3a–3c and 4 witness a strong correlation between success rate
and the percentage of “2/√γ ≥ minimum distance”—the lower the
percentage the less vulnerable the model.
Margin Explanation.Wehave also observed a positive correlation
between margin per support vector and the minimum distance cal-
culated above. These findings suggest that separated inter-class
support vectors lead to more secure models, lending experi-
mental support to the geometric argument (Section 4).
Linear SVM. The experiments are performed for linear SVMs on
MNIST, with results serving as baseline. Table 2d demonstrates that
success rates under linear models are 100%, as expected. However,
a larger C requires smaller changes to the target sample, as larger
C leads to smaller margin.
Discussion on model robustness vs. overfitting. It should be
noted that we are not suggesting larger γ induces robustness. In-
stead, we demonstrate a phrase transition with small increase to γ
causes significant success rate drop for evasion attacks. Further in-
crease to γ over the threshold value offers little benefit. Our current
results suggest that the model may (Table 4) or may not (Tables 2, 3)
overfit when γ reaches the threshold value.
6.3 Impact of γ on Vulnerability (Multiclass)
This section further investigates the impact of γ on success rate of
evasion attacks, in multiclass scenarios. For the MNIST dataset, two
RBF SVMs with γ as 0.05 and 0.5, are trained on both D1 and D2,
respectively. For comparison, four linear SVMs are also trained on
, ,
Table 2: Success rate and average L1 change for gradient-descent method evasion attacks (binary class, MNIST).
(a) RBF SVM: MNIST, digits 1 and 2.
γ 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.05 0.1 0.11 0.125 0.5
C 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104 10
Accuracy(%) 99.4 99.5 99.6 99.5 99.8 99.7 99.5 98.6
1→ 2 Succ rate (%) 100 100 100 100 90.1 68.9 36.3 1.5
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 100 100 68.4 55.0 35.0 0.1
2→ 1 Succ rate (%) 94.1 68.9 54.8 17.0 11.3 13.3 15.2 12.9
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 100 59.3 7.5 4.8 2.8 0.1
(b) RBF SVM: MNIST, digits 3 and 4.
γ 0.01 0.025 0.035 0.05 0.125 0.5
C 104 104 104 104 104 10
Accuracy(%) 99.5 99.7 99.6 99.5 99.5 99.8
3→ 4 Succ rate (%) 100 94.5 76.0 53.4 14.8 5.3
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 96.7 61.7 0.29 0.1
4→ 3 Succ rate (%) 100 100 98.1 82.5 11.8 1.6
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 99.2 79.7 0.4 0.1
(c) RBF SVM: MNIST, digits 5 and 7.
γ 0.01 0.025 0.035 0.05 0.1 0.5
C 104 104 104 104 104 10
Accuracy(%) 99.3 99.5 99.6 99.6 99.1 99.7
5→ 7 Succ rate (%) 100 97.0 87.4 71.1 41.8 6.2
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 98.7 75.6 0.2 0.1
7→ 5 Succ rate (%) 100 100 99.8 91.1 15.5 2.3
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 100 87.2 0.2 0.1
(d) Linear SVM.
C = 1000 C = 5000
Succ rate (%) Ave L1 change Accuracy (%) Succ rate (%) Ave L1 change Accuracy (%)
1→ 2 100 22.8 99.3 100 18.4 99.2
2→ 1 100 37.5 100 34.8
3→ 4 100 39.5 99.7 100 37.3 99.6
4→ 3 100 32.8 100 25.9
5→ 7 100 30.4 99.0 100 28.1 99.0
7→ 5 100 29.1 100 23.6
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Figure 6: Phase transition of the success rate for gradient-descent method evasion attacks.
Adequacy of the Gradient-Descent Method for
Classifier Evasion Attacks , ,
Table 3: Success rate for gradient-descent method evasion attacks (binary class, USPS).
(a) RBF SVM: USPS, digits 0 and 1.
γ 0.001 0.003 0.006 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.1
C 104 104 104 5 × 103 5 × 103 5 × 103 103
Accuracy(%) 99.2 99.5 99.4 99.5 99.5 99.4 99.4
0→ 1 Succ rate (%) 100 82.3 52.4 25.3 4.7 3.4 3.6
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 100 100 35.7 6.0 0.6
1→ 0 Succ rate (%) 100 100 100 100 66.7 8.0 5.7
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 100 100 100 98.3 22.0
(b) RBF SVM: USPS, digits 2 and 3.
γ 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.1
C 105 105 105 105
Accuracy(%) 97.5 97.8 97.8 97.8
2→ 3 Succ rate (%) 100 69.2 36.3 26.9
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 97.9 45.4 4.6
3→ 2 Succ rate (%) 100 80.7 42.9 25.2
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 52.1 11.1
(c) RBF SVM: USPS, digits 6 and 7.
γ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
C 104 104 104 104
Accuracy(%) 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
6→ 7 Succ rate (%) 92.9 54.1 29.4 8.2
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 99.2 65.9 19.4
7→ 6 Succ rate (%) 100 77.6 48.3 9.6
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 86.5 24.3
Table 4: Success rate for gradient-descent method evasion attacks (binary class, Spambase).
γ 0.2 1 5 10 20 50 100
C 5 × 105 5 × 105 105 105 105 105 5 × 104
Accuracy(%) 91.3 92.9 92.9 92.9 92.6 92.1 91.4
0→ 1a Succ rate (%) 61.7 54.6 54.2 48.6 39.9 31.4 9.9
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 99.9 94.5 86.8 73.3 53.6 41.8
1→ 0 Succ rate (%) 41.8 41.0 39.8 38.8 34.6 18.8 13.3
P (2/√γ ≥ MinDist ) (%) 100 100 97.7 94.6 89.4 64.6 41.7
a 0: not spam, 1: spam
D1 and D2 with different values of C . For the USPS dataset, three
RBF SVMs are trained, where γ = 0.02, 0.1 and 0.5. An attack is still
considered successful if the perturbed test sample is misclassified
within 30 steps.
As can be seen from Tables 7 and 8: (1) for RBF SVMs, the success
rates under the models with larger γ are much lower; (2) for linear
SVMs the success rates are always 100%, but the average L1 change
is smaller as C increases—observations consistent with previous
results.
7 EXPERIMENTS: GRADIENT-QUOTIENT
METHOD
In this section we present experimental results establishing the
effectiveness of our proposed method for generating adversarial
samples.
7.1 Attacking SVMs & RBF Networks Directly
Recall that based on our new approach, a test sample x is updated as
xt+1 = xt −εt ·∇(f1(x)/f2(x)), where f1(x) and f2(x) are the scores
for the top two scoring classes for x . In order to test whether this
method is more effective than the popular gradient-descent method,
we run similar experiments to Section 6.3, (1) for the MNIST dataset,
one RBF SVM (γ = 0.5,C = 10) and one linear SVM (C = 1000) are
trained on D1,D2, . . . ,D5, respectively; (2) for the USPS dataset,
the RBF SVM with γ = 0.5,C = 102 is reused.
Comparing the results in Table 7 and Table 9, we observe that the
gradient quotient method is very effective against SVMs trained on
the MNIST dataset: (1) for the RBF SVMs with γ = 0.5, the success
rates increase from around 24% to a resounding 100%. Moreover
we have tested a wide range of values for γ from 0.01 through
, ,
Table 5: Success rate of gradient-descent method evasion at-
tacks (binary class, MNIST, with L1 and L∞ limit)
(a) digits 1 and 2, B1=39.2, B∞=0.3
γ 0.01 0.05 0.1
C 5 × 104 5 × 104 5 × 104
Accuracy (%) 99.4 99.5 99.8
Succ rate (%) 1→ 2 99.5 92.7 30.4
2→ 1 27.2 8.4 9.8
(b) digits 3 and 4, B1=39.2, B∞=0.3
γ 0.01 0.05 0.125
C 104 104 104
Accuracy (%) 99.5 99.5 99.5
Succ rate (%) 3→ 4 34.5 18.8 12.5
4→ 3 44.4 24.3 6.1
(c) digits 5 and 7, B1=39.2, B∞=0.3
γ 0.01 0.05 0.1
C 104 104 104
Accuracy (%) 99.3 99.6 99.1
Succ rate (%) 5→ 7 48.8 24.2 25.7
7→ 5 51.6 22.8 7.1
Table 6: Success rate of gradient-descent method evasion at-
tacks (binary class, USPS, with L1 and L∞ limit)
(a) digits 0 and 1, B1=76.8, B∞=0.6
γ 0.001 0.01 0.03 0.06
C 104 5 × 103 5 × 103 5 × 103
Accuracy (%) 99.2 99.5 99.5 99.4
Succ rate (%) 0→ 1 22.2 10.9 4.7 3.1
1→ 0 100 100 29.5 8.8
(b) digits 2 and 3, B1=51.2, B∞=0.3
γ 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.1
C 105 105 105 105
Accuracy (%) 97.8 97.8 97.8 97.8
Succ rate (%) 2→ 3 50.3 34.2 25.4 20.2
3→ 2 52.5 38.7 25.2 12.9
(c) digits 6 and 7, B1=76.8, B∞=0.6
γ 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.06
C 104 104 104 104
Accuracy (%) 99.7 99.7 99.7 99.7
Succ rate (%) 6→ 7 58.9 38.2 19.4 7.6
7→ 6 80.8 52.1 26.0 8.2
10, with resulting success rates always 100% under our new
approach; (2) the required L1 perturbation also decreases.
However, the new method achieves a success rate of only 71.2%
(still higher than the gradient descent method’s 38.2%) against the
RBF SVM trained on the USPS dataset. An examination of the log
files reveals that in this case, the second highest score f2 is always
negative, and hence decreasing the quotient of f1/f2 may not work.
Table 7: Success rate and average L1 change of gradient-
descent method evasion attack, in multiclass scenarios,
MNISTa
Accuracy
(%)
Succ rate
(%)
Ave L1
change
RBF
(γ = 0.05, C = 103)
Model 1 87.2 91.8 39.4b
Model 2 87.7 92.8 40.5b
RBF
(γ = 0.5, C = 10)
Model 1 94.8 24.4 17.7b
Model 2 94.8 23.7 18.2b
Linear
(C = 103)
Model 1 89.0 100 28.5
Model 2 89.2 100 26.8
Linear
(C = 2 × 104)
Model 1 91.4 100 18.7
Model 2 91.7 100 18.1
a Since it takes more than an order of magnitude longer to run experiments using
RBF SVM than linear kernel, each result regarding RBF SVM is based on 1000
test samples, while each linear SVM result is based on 5000 test samples.
b Only the successful cases are counted.
Table 8: Success rate and average L1 change of gradient-
descent method evasion attack, in multiclass scenarios,
USPSa
γ C Accuracy (%) Succ rate (%) Ave L1 change
0.02 104 89.9 89.6 42.5b
0.1 2 × 103 92.1 38.7 40.7b
0.5 102 95.0 38.2 40.9b
a Each result is based on 1500 test samples.
b Only the successful cases are counted.
Interestingly, such finding coincides with our previous conclusion
that models with wider inter-class gap are more robust.
Attacking RBF networks. Does the gradient quotient method
work with other types of model? We further test it against a RBF
network trained on D1, with 600 RBF neurons and a learning rate
of 0.05. The results show that the success rate is 74.1% (f2 is also
negative in this case), which is slightly lower than the gradient
descent method’s 79.9%.
In summary, the proposed gradient quotient method works most
effectively when the scores for both the original and target classes
are positive. In other situations, it performs at least similarly to
the gradient descent method—none of our experimental results
on all datasets and two types of models has shown any obvious
inferiority.
7.2 Attacking via Surrogate
Up until now, we have implicitly assumed that the attacker pos-
sesses complete knowledge of the target classifier, which may be
unrealistic in practice. Hence, we next examine attacks carried
out via a surrogate. For example, in order to mislead a RBF SVM,
the attacker first trains their own RBF SVM on a similar dataset,
builds the attack path of how a test sample should be modified, then
applies it to the target SVM.
Since there is no guarantee that the surrogate and target classi-
fiers misclassify the test sample simultaneously, all test samples are
modified 15 times by the surrogate in this experiment; an attack is
Adequacy of the Gradient-Descent Method for
Classifier Evasion Attacks , ,
Table 9: Success rate and average L1 change of the evasion
attack (the gradient quotient method, multiclass scenarios,
MNIST).a
Accuracy
(%)
Succ rate
(%)
AveL1
change
RBF
(γ = 0.5,
C = 10)
Model 1 94.8 100 17.8
Model 2 94.8 100 17.9
Model 3 95.0 100 17.4
Model 4 95.2 100 17.5
Model 5 95.0 100 18.1
Linear
(C = 103)
Model 1 89.0 100 19.3
Model 2 89.2 100 20.6
Model 3 89.1 100 20.9
Model 4 89.2 100 20.8
Model 5 88.9 100 19.9
a Each result regarding RBF SVM is based on 800 test samples, while each result
on linear SVM is based on 5000 test samples.
considered to be successful if the target classifier misclassifies the
adversarial sample within 15 steps too. In addition, we modify the
method as:
xt+1 =

xt − εt · ∇(f1(xt )/f2(xt )) prior to surrogate
misclassification
xt + εt · ∇(f1(xt )/f2(xt )) otherwise
In other words, before the test sample is misclassified by the sur-
rogate, it travels “downhill”, but after crossing the decision bound-
ary it travels “uphill”. Otherwise the test case continues oscillating
back and forth around the boundary.
Intra-model transferability.We reuse the RBF SVMs trained on
D1,D2, . . . ,D5, each of which serving as both surrogate (Si ) and
target (Ti ) classifiers. As can be seen from Table 10, the success rates
are all over 65%. Specifically, those values inside the bracket are
the success rates when the target classifier misclassifies before the
surrogate, while the values outside are the overall success rates. For
comparison, the same experiments have been performed for linear
SVMs, producing similar success rates (54%—71%), notably higher
thanprevious findings (around 40%) reported by Papernot et al.
[30].
Table 10: Success rate of evasion attacks via surrogate (RBF
SVM, MNIST).a
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5
S1 100 66.1 (9.2) 69.8 (9.5) 68.3 (9.8) 66.4 (7.1)
S2 68.0 (8.2) 100 67.2 (8.4) 72.4 (10.4) 67.9 (7.4)
S3 65.0 (8.4) 66.1 (9.4) 100 67.3 (11.1) 65.9 (8.5)
S4 65.3 (10.0) 67.2 (10.8) 67.0 (10.6) 100 65.3 (8.8)
S5 67.0 (9.2) 67.8 (8.9) 69.4 (9.0) 69.4 (9.1) 100
a Each result is based on 800 test samples.
Inter-model transferability. Is gradient quotient based evasion
attack still effective if the surrogate and target models are of dif-
ferent types? We keep the above five RBF SVMs as surrogate, but
change the target classifier to the RBF network (trained onD1) from
the last subsection. The results show that the success rates range
from 61.3% to 69.1%, which are very close to the values in Table 10.
7.3 Mimicry Attacks
The previous two subsections have demonstrated that our new
approach is effective in manipulating test samples. But what if the
attacker intends to make the test sample misclassified as a specific
class?
In order to test the gradient quotient method for mimicry attacks,
we make the following change: xt+1 = xt − εt · ∇(f1(x)/fT (x)),
where fT (x) corresponds to the score of the target class, while f1(x)
is still the score for the top scoring class.
For each test sample in the MNIST dataset, we apply the gradient
quotient algorithm to check whether it can be misclassified as each
of the other nine digits. The RBF SVM (γ = 0.5,C = 10) and the
linear SVM (C = 1000) trained on D1 are reused here. The results
in Figure 7 show that in most cases this approach can successfully
make the original digit misclassified as the target. However, under
the RBF SVM, the success rate is very low when the attack is to
make other digits look like “0”. The reason is still that f0(x), i.e., the
score for digit “0”, is always negative.
Another interesting point is that among the successful cases
where other digits are misclassified as “0”, over half of them are
digit “6”. Therefore, we tried an indirect method—first modify the
test sample so that it is considered as “6” (the success rate for this
step is 100%), and then follow the original method, i.e., modify “6”
until either it is classified as “0”, or the maximum step limit of 30 is
reached. This indirect approach doubled the overall success rate.
8 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Recent studies have shown that it is relatively easy to fool machine
learning models via adversarial samples. In this paper, we demon-
strate that the gradient-descent method—the leading approach to
generate adversarial samples—has limitations against RBF SVMs,
when the precision parameter γ controlling kernel smoothness is
chosen properly. We find predictable phase transitions of attack
success occur at thresholds that are functions of geometric margin-
like quantities measuring inter-class support vector distances. Our
characterisation can be used to make RBF SVMmore robust against
common evasion and mimicry attacks.
We propose a new method for manipulating target samples into
adversarial instances, with experimental results showing that this
new method not only increases attack success rate, but decreases
the required changes made to input points.
For future work, (1) regarding the gradient-descent method, we
intend to replicate and expand findings forγ and smoothness in gen-
eral, in other settings and for other classifiers. (2) We will continue
exploring suitability of our new generation approach when the
target is not an SVM, with direct attacks or SVM surrogates. (3) Fur-
ther investigation into light-weight yet efficient countermeasures
also serves as an important direction for future work.
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